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Theme1: The existence of large state-owned Chinese firms and private investors 
engaged in investing primarily, but not exclusively, in resource and infrastructure sectors 
in SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) is a major preoccupation in economic and political circles. In 
order to understand it, Chinese investment has to be differentiated into four different 
types, and its distinctive characteristic unpacked –ie, the bundling together of aid, trade 
and FDI (foreign direct investment)–. This has major policy implications for how SSA 
should relate to Chinese investors in order to maximise available opportunities. 
 
 
Summary: There is widespread economic and political interest in the impact of Chinese 
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). This paper distinguishes between four different 
types of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), primarily focusing on SSA’s engagement 
with large state-owned Chinese firms investing in SSA’s resource and infrastructure 
sectors. Although there is a paucity of published research, it also provides evidence on 
private Chinese FDI in wholesale/retail, manufacturing, and services. The available 
evidence drawn from a variety of sources –macro, micro, firm surveys and country 
reports– on the extent of different types of Chinese investment is discussed. The 
distinctive character of large-scale state-owned Chinese investors is summed up in the 
bundling together of aid, trade and FDI, in contrast to traditional western trends which 
seek to unbundle these factors. The paper concludes that SSA countries should maximise 
the opportunities opened to them by their resource-base by adopting a similarly integrated 
and focused response to Chinese (and other large) investors who seek to draw on the 






Why Chinese FDI is Important 
Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has grown 
rapidly in recent years. After identifying the different streams of FDI, this paper focuses on 
the family of predominantly state-owned Chinese firms (SOEs) operating in the resource 
and infrastructure sectors, pointing to their integration with Chinese aid and trade. It is 
here that Chinese FDI is placed into global context and suggested that it is distinctive 
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The Dynamics of Chinese FDI Flows to SSA 
China’s relations with Africa in the modern era have undergone three phases. The first 
followed the Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in 1955, where China, partly 
driven by its rivalry with the USSR, offered support to decolonising Africa. This analysis 
covers the second phase, of the mid-1990s and onwards. Following a substantial growth 
in trade with Africa and a growing need for resources, large and predominantly state-
owned Chinese enterprises (SOEs) entered SSA as investors and as contractors to 
Chinese-aid-funded projects in infrastructure and public buildings. The third phase of 
Chinese interaction with SSA is one involving small- and medium-sized, predominantly 
private-sector, enterprises. Some are incorporated in China and have extended their 
operations to SSA and others have been started ab initio in SSA. 
 
The three types of Chinese investors in SSA are shown in Figure 1. ‘State-owned’ and 
‘private’ are unclear, since one of China’s unique characteristics has been the fuzzy lines 
drawn between the state and private sectors in ownership. Many ‘SOEs’ function as 
conduits for private gain, in that profits are appropriated by key individuals who are not 
formal owners of the firms. Similarly, the returns from many ‘private’ firms are partial 
reflections of state decision-making. Thus, ownership in China is a complex amalgam 
which Nolan characterises as an ‘ownership maze’ with ‘vaguely-defined property rights’ 
(Nolan, 2005, p. 169). 
 
The SOEs, predominantly investing in resource extraction and infrastructure, can be 
segmented between those owned by the Central Government and those accountable to 
provincial governments. Central government SOEs tend to operate under formal state-to-
state agreements and hence are expected to take the government’s strategic objectives 
into consideration in their African operations. The provincially-owned firms reflect the 
initiatives of their decentralised state administrations, often built on regional diasporas in 
SSA (see Gu, 2009), and are under pressure to operate profitably so as to contribute 
revenue to provincial governments. The private sector firms cover the spectrum of SMEs 
incorporated in China and investing in SSA, perhaps as a first venture outside their home 
base. They also include a limited number of very large firms, such as Huawei in telecoms. 
The large- and medium-sized China-based firms generally operate in the manufacturing 
and communications sectors, as well as in wholesale trading. The other end of the private 
spectrum involves small to micro enterprises, either in petty manufacturing or in small-
scale retail. 
 
This paper is primarily focused on the Chinese SOE FDI in SSA. 
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Source: adapted from Corkin (2009) and Gu (2009). 
 
Chinese FDI in SSA 
Estimates of FDI flows are notoriously inaccurate. The weak recording practices in SSA 
increase the unreliability of data on Chinese investment flows there. There are four sets of 
estimates of the extent and nature of these flows: (1) official and public-domain estimates 
of the extent and distribution of Chinese FDI in SSA; (2) AERC study estimates of the 
extent and distribution of Chinese FDI in SSA; (3) UNIDO’s survey of FDI in SSA; and (4) 
primary studies of small private-sector Chinese FDI. 
 
(1) Official and public-domain estimates of the extent and distribution of Chinese FDI in 
SSA. Official estimates of China’s FDI flows to SSA are contradictory and understate 
their true significance. Drawing on a variety of official sources, Besada et al. estimate 
that Chinese FDI flows into Africa exceeded US$500 million in 2006, rising from 
US$400 million in 2005 (Besada et al., 2008). UNCTAD data suggest inflows rising 
from US$1.5 million in 1991 to US$61 million in 2003 and US$1.6 billion in 2005. In 
terms of relative shares, Gelb (2010) draws on the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
database (MOFCOM) to differentiate real Chinese FDI from flows and holdings in the 
Cayman Islands (CI) and British Virgin Islands (BVI) as well as round-tripping through 
Hong Kong (HK). Africa then accounts for 40% (the largest share) of Chinese FDI in 
2008. Chinese FDI is concentrated in the Sudan, Algeria, Zambia, Nigeria and South 
Africa, accounting for 71% of Chinese FDI in Africa. 
 
Between 1979 and 2000, 46% of Chinese FDI was in the manufacturing sector (mostly 
clothing), while services, mainly construction, accounted for 18% and resource extraction 
accounting for 28%. China’s FDI in oil and gas exploration has been concentrated in 
Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, the Sudan and Gabon. In 2007 the State-owned 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China invested US$5.4 billion acquiring a 20% 
strategic stake in Standard Bank of South Africa. 
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(2) AERC Study estimates of the extent and distribution of Chinese FDI in SSA. In 2006-
07 the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) undertook studies in 21 SSA 
countries to assess their trade, aid and investment relations with China. In 2009-10 a 
further 20 studies in 14 countries were completed. 
 
The research (www.aercafrica.org/publications/category.asp) outlines three groups: those 
in which Chinese FDI plays a relatively significant role, a moderate role and a low-
significance role. They show that oil-gas and mining investments are of considerable 
significance in some economies. In agriculture, the primary sector of Chinese involvement 
is cotton, but only in Zambia. Chinese FDI in telecoms is widespread throughout the 20 
economies. There are significant investments in utilities. It is the construction and 
infrastructure sector where Chinese FDI is most pervasive, some of it in show-piece 
construction –government buildings and sport stadiums–. FDI in manufacturing is 
primarily in labour intensive activities –garments dominate–. There is also a spread of 
investments in small-scale manufacturing enterprises, which do not surface in official 
statistics but, like Chinese retail traders, may have a more substantial socio-economic 
impact. Small-scale petty-trading by Chinese migrants is widespread in almost every 
economy, but is often unrecorded. The AERC studies reveal limited gains in local 
employment creation and a significant use of an expatriate labour force. 
 
(3) UNIDO’s survey of FDI in SSA. In 2005 UNIDO conducted a survey of 1,216 foreign 
enterprises operating in 15 African economies. Comparing Chinese, Indian and South 
African and Western investors, Chinese firms were younger, had lower sales per 
worker (but with higher sales growth), were more export-oriented and had low 
investment rates and low annual wages. Chinese respondent firms were clustered in 
low value-added export-oriented low-wage assembly operations (eg, garments). 
 
(4) Primary studies of small private sector Chinese FDI. Chinese FDI that is much harder 
to track, but with increasingly significant socio-economic impact, is in the private 
sector. Gu (2009) reports Chinese EXIM Bank estimates of around 800 China-
incorporated firms that have established operations in SSA as a whole. However, she 
estimates the number of private firms to be more than 2,000. Although no numbers 
are provided on employment, most of these firms appear to be small- or medium-
sized. A second set of primary research on Chinese private sector firms is Brautigam 
(2008) on small-scale investments in Mauritius arising from a history of Chinese 
immigration –reinforcing the importance of diasporas in private-sector FDI–. 
 
The AERC studies provide a third window into China’s small scale investors through their 
links as suppliers to large-scale SOEs in the infrastructure and resource sectors. The 
Sudan is a particularly illuminating case. Between 2000 and 2007, 97 Chinese SMEs 
provided inputs for 13 SOEs in the oil sector. 
 
Finally, we have research looking at small-scale firms operating predominantly in 
manufacturing and services, small construction firms and petty manufacturing. A large 
and unrecorded number of Chinese individuals operate as small scale entrepreneurs 
(Mohan & Kale, 2007; Mohan & Power, 2008; Dobler, 2008). A relatively new set of 
trading entrepreneurs are Chinese wholesalers who act as a platform for associated 
retailing activities in neighbouring countries by other small-scale migrant entrepreneurs 
(‘platform economies’). These, too, are observed but are not systematically recorded. 
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How Distinctive is Chinese FDI in SSA? 
The SOE category of Chinese FDI in SSA is predominantly clustered in large-scale 
resource-oriented ventures (Burke & Corkin, 2006; Broadman, 2007, p. 275; Ajakaiye et 
al., 2008) and predominantly bundled with Chinese aid in projects designed to meet China 
resource needs. 
 
(1) Terms of trade reversal and the growing importance of resources. Since at least the 
1870s there has been a trend for the terms of trade to turn against the commodities 
export sector. Prices of manufactures have usually risen faster. However, between 
2002 and 2008 prices boomed across the spectrum of commodities. This ‘super-cycle’ 
comprised a longer period than previous spikes. There are sound reasons to believe 
that it will last, despite the financial-sector induced bust after August 2008. Unlike 
previous periods, the current boom is fuelled by a massive demand in the Asian driver 
economies which have a high income-elasticity of demand for commodities (IMF, 
2007; Farooki, 2009). This affects the demand for energy (with spin-offs into 
agriculture for bio-fuels), minerals and food crops (FAO, 2007; Freeman, Holslag & 
Weil, 2009). Primary commodities are therefore likely to remain in short supply 
globally, and prices are likely to be sustained. 
 
Africa is especially well favoured by these developments, not so much in terms of its 
existing commodities, but for its potential exports. It is the primary base for the future 
of many mineral commodities. In many mineral commodities, Africa is the primary 
resource base for the future. In energy, it is not so much Africa’s share of global 
reserves which is so strategically important, but its reserves of unallocated reserves. 
 
According to McKinsey, nearly one-quarter of Chinese FDI in the extractive industry is 
also involved in infrastructure development and resource processing, (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2010). A large part of these investments are focused on providing 
transport routes for the export of resources. Since 2005, Chinese total infrastructure 
commitments to SSA have exceeded those of the World Bank (McKinsey Global 
Institute, 2010). 
 
(2) The strategic integration of Chinese operations in SSA. With the exception of small-
scale copper mining smelters in Zambia and the DRC, all of these resource-based 
Chinese investments have been large in scale and have involved Chinese SOE (both 
Central-State SOEs and Provincial-Government SOEs). In all these sectors, 
particularly in infrastructure for trade (Foster et al., 2008), Chinese aid has 
complemented these trade and FDI flows. 
 
The close link between trade, FDI and financial flows has historical precedents. In the 
colonial era these three vectors were fused and the imperial powers’ interests in SSA 
were closely coordinated. As Africa was decolonised, the aid, trade and FDI vectors 
were increasingly separated because of an increasing opposition from SSA countries, 
who saw the integration as too costly since tied aid generally led to much higher-cost 
inputs. New economic actors were emerging (notably the US) and the integration of 
vectors locked them out of markets. There was growing public opposition in the OECD 
economies against what was seen as an exploitative framework and multilateral aid 
was growing in importance, so that the International Financial Institutions insisted on 
the delinking of aid, trade and FDI. 
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China’s presence in SSA departs from this recent orthodoxy and represents a 
reversion to the patterns of historical colonial links between mother countries and SSA 
colonies. Particularly in the case of large-scale infrastructural and mining projects, this 
takes the form of the strategic integration of various inputs from China. It is therefore 
impossible to unbundle what constitutes Chinese ‘aid’ and ‘FDI’ (Ajakaiye et al., 2008). 
The so-called ‘Angola-model’ has become a framework for much of China’s SOE 
activity in SSA. It describes an integrated package in which China’s EXIM Bank 
provides a line of credit at subsidised interest rates. Chinese firms then tender for 
infrastructural projects, tied to the use of Chinese inputs with intensive use of Chinese 
skills. The bulk of these ‘aid’ funds never leave China but are transferred from the 
EXIM Bank to the firms which have won the tenders. These funds are repaid by the 
recipient country as a drawdown on commodity exports back to China. Not all aid 
follows the ‘Angola-model’. China also provides for politically sensitive and prestigious 
projects but often where it has a direct resource interest and where it seeks to build a 
long-term presence. 
 
(3) China’s investment in SSA: a departure from trend? The most-used framework for 
assessing the drivers of FDI was developed by Dunning (2000) who identified three 
primary explanatory factors, the so-called OLI framework: ownership, location and 
internalisation. The ‘ownership’ factor describes special competences, motivations 
and power to control foreign affiliates, which reflect the nature of the firms involved. 
‘Location’ explains why they operate in a particular country. This may be because of 
market possibilities (‘market-seeking FDI’), resource-seeking FDI or because the 
country has low operating costs (‘cost-reducing FDI’). ‘Internalisation’ explains why 
foreign firms prefer to own their operations as opposed to licensing or selling their 
technologies. 
 
Mathews (2002) has suggested a fourth factor, the ‘linkages’ driver, to explain FDI 
from the Asian Tigers, especially in relation to their investments in high-income 
economies insofar as firms invest abroad not to exploit their firm-competences, but in 
order to augment these competences by learning from their overseas operations. 
While it is debated whether this ‘leveraging’ is really new (since it arguably reflects 
firm-competences in business strategy and technology acquisition –Dunning, 2006; 
Narula, 2006–), there does seem to be a new flow of FDI from low- and middle-
income economies like China, India and Brazil. 
 
Utilising the Dunning framework (as augmented by Mathews), is it possible to 
compare the investments by Chinese SOEs with those of the historically-dominant 
Western firms? With respect to the strategic integration of aid, Chinese SOE FDI in 
SSA is distinctive and differs markedly from the global trend to unbundle investment 
from aid. Most FDI from China has reflected a relatively tight bundling of investment 
with tied aid, designed to facilitate the export of natural resources, predominantly 
directly to China. 
 
In terms of ownership characteristics, Western firms investing in SSA are usually 
funded through stock markets. The emphasis on ‘shareholder value’ means that they 
have a short-term profit objective and are very risk-averse. By contrast, with cheap 
(and often subsidised) long-term capital, Chinese SOEs operate with long-term time-
horizons and are less risk-averse (Tull, 2006; Zeng & Williamson, 2007). The 
exception to this has been small investments by Chinese private firms, for example in 
Zambian and DRC copper smelting. Finally, most Western firms are constrained by 
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accords like the Paris Declaration, affecting labour rights and general practices. By 
contrast, Chinese SOEs operate in a relatively unfettered environment. 
 
In terms of location-specific factors, resource-seeking investments are found in both 
Western and Chinese FDI. However, many Western TNCs have operations in SSA to 
meet the needs of domestic consumers and many of these investments are long-lived. 
By contrast, a small component of Chinese FDI has been market-seeking. The use of 
SSA as a low-cost export platform is largely confined to the garments sector, and 
reflects tariff preferences in major Western markets. 
 
Learning factors also play a more important role for Chinese firms using SSA as a 
test-bed for overseas investments. Finally, although some Chinese garment exporters 
incorporate their SSA garments operations in their clothing exports, these are only 
very isolated examples of their integration of SSA subsidiaries in global value chains. 




Policy Implications for Engaging with Large Chinese Dragons 
What are the optimal responses to ensure that the entrance of Chinese FDI is turned into 
developmental opportunity? This requires a focus on the development of strategic 
capabilities and the roles played by key developmental actors. 
 
(a) Developing strategic capabilities: SSA is not without its attractions to Chinese 
investors. The key, therefore, is for it to use its commodities to its best advantage and 
use this power to leverage advantageous terms in agreements with China. In 
developing a strategic agenda, they can benefit from integrating the aid, trade and 
FDI. Meeting China’s trade needs should be conditional upon their providing aid to 
exploit these commodities, as well as meeting SSA’s developmental and 
infrastructural needs. 
 
(b) Policy actors: who in SSA is going to drive this strategic agenda? It will necessarily 
involve individual governments as they hold the levers which determine access to their 
economies. They each need to coordinate an integrated strategic response to offer 
access to their resources in a way which meets their country’s needs. Formal written 
strategies which are not implemented effectively are much less use than dynamic and 
active coalitions of local interests interacting effectively amongst themselves and with 
emerging country partners. 
 
Another arena for integrated response is in regional forums –SADC, ECOWAS and the 
AU–. These multi-country organisations are important in their aggregation of African 
countries in the bargaining process and in the protection of countries with fewer 
commodities, so as to develop intra-regional trade capacity. 
 
In conclusion, although we have pointed to the distinctive character of Chinese SOE-
driven FDI in SSA, and the opening this creates to negotiating aid and economic 
assistance with China, this only partially addresses the problem. Undertaking the 
necessary research and developing policies is not enough. The question is how can it 
ensure that such policy and strategies stick? The real issue is whether SSA countries 
have the human resource capacity and institutional capability to negotiate these 
agreements effectively, as well as the political will and legitimacy to enforce, and gain 
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maximum advantage from them. Institutional governance is one of SSA’s greatest 
challenges. Without this implementing capacity, the agreements are likely to be notional, 
nothing more than granting advantage to China in its interaction with Africa and its global 
diplomatic strategic initiatives under the cloak of a developmental agenda. 
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